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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The wide variation in effective tax rateson income from different types of
capital received by different investorscreates numerous tax arbitrage
opportunities that result in a loss in both governmentrevenue and
economic efficiency. The objective of this chapter isto estimate the revenue
and distributional effects of tax arbitrage, usingtax data from 1983, by
examining the effects of two tax changes that would eachsubstantially
reduce the opportunities for tax arbitrage.
Our principal conclusions are as follows:
Taxing real rather than nominal interest income wouldhave raised
government revenue in 1983 by $25.5 billion.
This increase in revenue would occur mainlyat the expense of those in
the highest tax brackets.
Taxing the cash flow from real capital and exemptingfrom tax any
income from financial assets would have raisedgovernment revenue by
$17.4 billion. Since this tax change eliminates all distortionsto savings
and investment decisions, our revenue forecastsuggests that the tax law
in 1983 subsidized savings and investmenton average.
We would like to thank Chris Ferrall, Laura Kalambokidis, and JosephDaniel for careful and
able research assistance.90Gordon & Sleinrod
This tax change would benefit those in the highest taxbrackets, who
have large income from financial assets, at the expenseof those in lower
tax brackets.
Either tax change should improve the efficiencyof the allocation of
existing capital and improve savings incentives.
1. INTRODUCTION
The appropriate tax treatment of capital incomehas been debated for many
years among both academicsand government officials. Perhaps as a result
of this debate, the actual tax treatment ofcapital income is extremely
complicated and has changed frequently. IRAs, pensions,and equivalent
plans are taxed as they would be under a cash-flowtax,1 and the return to
owner-occupied housing and consumer durables is tax exempt.Many
other types of capital income are taxed, somequite heavily. The asset
whose income is probably taxed mostheavily is one that pays interest
income, where the entire nominal return onthe asset is fully taxable each
year.
This chapter argues that the simultaneous presenceof these differences
in the tax treatment of various types ofcapital income, and differences in
personal tax rates, leads to substantial inefficienciesand inequities in the
existing tax system. We argue that if thesedifferences in the tax treatment
of various types of capital income wereeliminated, the tax system would
raise more revenue and be less distorting, evenif all capital income were
made entirely tax exempt.
The problem with the current tax system isthat the combination of
differences in the tax treatment of different typesof capital and differences
in personal tax rates inevitably opens uparbitrage opportunities. In a
typical case, an individual or a firm in a high taxbracket borrows heavily to
buy a lightly taxed or tax-exempt asset andthereby runs a large tax loss on
the transaction. Most likely, the interest payments areultimately received
by an individual in a low tax bracket or a tax-exemptentity such as a
pension fund. The possibffities for tax arbitrage aremany.2 For example,
high-tax-bracket individuals, say in a 50 percent taxbracket, may borrow
money at the going market interest rate,of say 8 percent, from lower-tax-
bracket individuals, either directly or morelikely through a financial
IUnder a cash-flow tax, investment expenditures would bedeductible in the year made, and
any future cash flow including revenuefrom the sale of capital assets would be fully taxable.
The governments in effect, acts as a coinvestor, paying somepercentage of any expenses and
receiving that percentage of the income, and in presentvalue collects no revenue from a
marginal investment.
2See Steuerle (1985) for an enumeration of various formsof arbitrage.Do We Collect any Revenue from Taxing Capital Income?91
intermediary, and invest the funds in tax-exempt bonds paying, for
example, 6 percent. The interest payments they make on the borrowed
funds are tax deductible.3 The interest payments received by the lower-tax-
bracket individuals are taxable, but at a very low tax rate, say 15 percent,so
that on net the government loses tax revenue from this transaction. To
complete the circle, these lower-tax-bracket individuals could obtain the
funds needed to make the loan by having their (low-income) municipality
borrow money at the tax-exempt rate and make the funds available to the
residents, either through reduced local taxes or through expenditure on
goods that local residents would otherwise have purchased directly. Of
course, the low-income residents would need to pay the interest on this
debt each year. The net result, per dollar of loan, for low-income individ-
uals, high-income individuals, and the government would be as follows:
Transaction Return to Return to Government
low-income high-income tax
individual individual revenue
Tax-exempt bond - 0.06 + 0.06 0
Loan + 0.08(1 - 0.15) - 0.08(1 - 0.5).08(0.15 - 0.5)
Total 0.008 0.02 - 0.28
As we see, both low- and high-tax-bracket individuals gain through this tax
arbitrage, at the expense of the government.
Several provisions have been enacted trying to restrict specific forms of
arbitrage. For example, individuals cannot deduct the interest from loans
used to purchase municipal bonds. Also, municipalities are now limited in
the degree to which they can issue municipal bonds and invest the
proceeds themselves in taxable bonds, though they can provide the funds to
their residents, who then can invest in taxable bonds, as in the preceding
example. However, any of these provisions are difficult to enforce, and in
any case many other arbitrage possibifities remain. If this tax arbitrage is
important enough, the government's attempt to tax capital income could
collect little or no revenue, or even (as we find) result in a loss in tax
revenue as well as create a host of distortions affecting capital allocation,
risk sharing, and saving-and-investment decisions.4
The tax law does not allow the deduction of interest on loans where funds are used to buy
tax-exempt bonds. This restriction can normally be avoided by using other capital, such as a
house, as collateral for the loan.
This point was made strongly in Steuerle (1985). Gordon and Slemrod (1986) focus on
arbitrage possibilities available to munidpalities.92Gordon & Slemrod
One objective of this chapter is to provide a preliminary assessment of
the importance of tax arbitrage, using data from individual tax returns in
1983 made available to researchers by the Treasury. We focus initially on
the tax treatment of interest income, since many types of tax arbitrage
involve borrowing to invest in more lightly taxed assets, and attempt to
calculate the effect on tax revenue and on the net income of different types
of individuals of subjecting to tax real rather than nominal interest income.
In the results reported here we find that had this tax change been enacted
in 1983, tax revenue would have risen, with the burden of the rise borne
heavily by those in higher tax brackets.5 We also argue that the resulting
behavioral responses would have increased revenue further and increased
efficiency.
We also explore the effects of moving to a modified cash-flow tax in
which all forms of capital income from financial assets are made tax
exempt, whereas investments in real assets are treated as they would be
under a consumption tax.6 Had these changes been made in 1983, other-
wise leaving the tax structure unchanged, government revenue net of
interest expense would have increased slightlywe estimate tax revenue
would fall very slightly, with a fall in personal taxes just offsetting a rise in
corporate taxes, but that the resulting fall in the market interest rate would
save the government more than enough in interest payments tooffset the
net loss in tax revenue. The main beneficiaries from the tax change would
be those in the highest income group who have large capital income.
These results do not take into account the effects of the recently enacted
tax changes. To some degree, the narrowing of tax rate differentials, the
cutback in several tax preference items, and the drop in the inflation rate
since 1983 will all reduce the gains from the two tax changes we investigate
here. However, the United States is now a large debtor, so any reduction
in the interest rate we pay on this debt is now much more important. Data
restrictions prevented us from attempting to examine the effects of modi-
fying the current law, so our results that examine the situation in 1983 must
be viewed merely as suggestive of what might happen if the changes were
made now.
The organization of the chapter is as follows. In section 2 we discuss
intuitively what we would expect to happen to the economy if real rather
We are aware of the political obstacles to limiting the full deductibility of nominal mortgage
interest payments. This chapter estimates the economic returns to overcoming the political
obstades. In Canada, mortgage interest is not deductible. Whether owner-occupied housing
is harmed by such a tax change depends on the degree to which the market interest rate fails
in response to the tax change.
6Specifically, we allowed expensing of new investments and taxed the cash flow arising from
these investments.Do We Collect any Revenue from Taxing Capital Income?93
than nominaJ interest income were taxed. In section3 we then use the
available data to forecast the size of the change intax revenue and in the tax
payments by different income groups if real rather than nominalinterest
were taxed or if a modified cash-flow tax were enacted, all assumingno
changes in behavior or in market prices. Then in section 4we discuss how
our forecasts would change when behavioral and price changesare taken
into account. Finally, we include a brief discussion of the efficiencyeffects
of these two tax changes, an estimate of therevenue losses from likely
transition rules were a cash-flow tax enacted,a discussion of how the
situation has changed due to the Tax Reform Act of1986, and a short
summary of the chapter.
2. IMPLICATIONS OF CHANGING THETAXATION OF
INTEREST INCOME
It helps to understand the effects ofa change in the tax treatment of interest
income in the complicated real world ifwe first think about this tax change
in a very simple stylized context. Considera closed economy in which
everyone has the same tax rate and there is no government debt,so all
interest payments by one individual represent interest receiptsby another
individual. If all interest paymentsare deductible in calculating taxable
income, and all interest income is taxable, the interest-relatedtax base is
exactly zerointerest payments exactly offset interestreceipts. If all tax-
payers face the same tax rate, it follows immediately that taxrevenue
collected on interest must also be exactlyzero. Furthermore, reducing the
tax on interest income would not change tax revenuewhatis lost in
revenue from reducing the tax on interest income is gained inrevenue from
reducing the deductibility of interest payments. In fact, inresponse to a tax
change the market interest rates would adjustso as to leave the net of tax
borrowing and lending rates exactly unchanged. Through thischange in
the market interest rate, all borrowers and lendersare left unaffected by the
tax change, and therefore the bond market continues to clear.This tax
change would have no real effects whatsoever.
What if there were government debtas well? In this case, the interest-
related tax base becomes positive. Because thegovernment collects reve-
nue on its outstanding debt, it would appear to lose revenue froma
reduced tax rate. This is not correct. Because the market interestrate would
This argument depends on the presumption that the Internal Revenue Servicecould defend
the zero tax base against attempts to underreport interest income andgenerate illegitimate
interest deductions. The incentive for this type of evasion would likely dependon both the tax
rate on interest income and the difference between this rate and the tax rateon other types of
capital income.94Gordon & Sleinrod
adjust to leave the net of tax interest rate unchanged,what the government
loses in tax revenue from reducing the tax onthe interest received by
holders of government bonds, it would gain frompaying a lower interest
rate to the holders of government bonds.As in the absence of government
debt, the change in interest taxation has no realeffects on the economy or
on government revenue.
Forecasting the effects of this tax change becomes morecomplicated
when certain other factors are introduced. Consider aslightly more realistic
example in which there are two assets: bonds, wherethe nominal income
is taxable, and physical capital, whereonly the real income is taxable. (We
assume the inflation rate is positive.)In addition, let different investors face
different tax rates. In this setting, we would end upinitially with those
facing the highest tax rates borrowing from the otherindividuals to buy all
the physical capitalthe relatively tax-favored statusof physical capital is
most valuable to those facing the highest tax rates.Those facing lower tax
rates end up lending to both the governmentand higher-tax-rate individ-
uals. If the tax rate on interest income and thedeductibffity of interest
payments were now reduced, the market interest ratewould fall as before,
although estimating the size of the fall would be morecomplicated. If the
policy change is large enough, bonds would becomethe tax-favored asset
and portfolio holdings would reverse, so those in thehighest tax brackets
would lend to both the government and those in thelowest tax brackets,
and those in the lowest tax brackets would borrow tobuy all the physical
capital.
To estimate the effect of reducing the taxation of interest ongovernment
revenue, we start by calculatingthe change in revenue arising from a
change in the fraction of interest income and paymentsthat are taxable or
tax deductible, assuming no otherchanges in taxable income. In the
foregoing example, this would provide a clear gainin tax revenue. As
before, we would, in addition, need to take into accountthe fall in the
market interest rate, which again saves the government revenue,though it
changes the size of interest income and interestdeductions appearing on
individual tax returns. Since the interest deductions aretaken by those in
high tax brackets, and the interest income isreceived by those in lower tax
brackets, the fall in the market interest rate raisestax revenue further by
reducing the gains from tax arbitrage. In addition,however, we would
need to take into account any rearrangementof individual portfolios, in
this case the possible shift in ownership ofphysical capital from high- to
low-tax-rate individuals, and any change intotal savings and physical
investment. We wifi discuss these and othercomplications in section 4.
Recognizing that the United States is open tointernational flows of
capital also has important implications. If, forexample, foreigners ownDo We Collect any Revenue from Taxing Capital Income?95
U.S. bonds on net, then cutting the tax rateon interest income (holding the
effective withholding tax on interest paidto foreigners constant) raises
more revenue than in the previous example, everything else equal,since to
that extent interest deductionson domestic tax returns exceed interest
income. Any fall in the market interest rate also lowers theamounts paid in
interest to foreigners. In 1983, however, accordingto the data in the Survey
of current business foreigners paid $47.9 billion ininterest payments to U.S.
firms while receiving only $28.9 billion in interestin return. Although on
net they received $13.1 billion in interest payments fromthe federal
government, they still would gain from any fall in the interestrate. By 1988,
however, the net flows should have reversed.
In addition, when the economy is open,a tax change wifi cause shifts in
foreign versus domestic ownership ofassets. Since, by assumption, only
domestic residents directly benefit from the reductionin the taxation of
interest income, foreign residents wifi find domestic bondsless attractive
after the tax change due to any fall in the interestrate. They therefore wifi
shift funds invested in bonds into othersecurities, both foreign and
domestic. Domestic residents, conversely, wifi shiftout of these other
securities into bonds. This rearrangement of portfolios raisestax revenue to
the extent that bonds remainmore heavily taxed than other assets.
Reducing the taxation of interest income is likely to reduce thewelfare of
taxpayers at the extremes of the income distribution. Those in thehighest
tax brackets who are net debtors would find itmore expensive to borrow,
so they are made worse off. But, in addition, those in the lowesttax
brackets may suffer because they would receivea lower interest rate on
their positive holdings of bonds, but they do not benefitsubstantially from
the lower tax rates. However, a sizable fraction of the fundsinvested at low
or zero tax rates belong to pension plans that are heavily owned by those
in higher tax brackets, so these higher-tax-bracketindividuals lose on both
counts. All residents benefit indirectly, however, from the gainin govern-
ment revenue that can be used to finance additionalexpenditures or to
lower tax rates. Aggregate individual losses wifi beless than the net
increase in government revenue to the extent that thereis an efficiency gain
from the tax change and a gain at theexpense of foreigners, who now
receive a lower return on their holdings of bonds.
Rather than changing proportionately the fraction ofinterest income and
interest deductions entering into the calculation oftaxable income, an
alternative would be to restrict solely the fraction ofinterest deductions
allowed.8 Under this alternative, individuals wouldsave considerable
8The Tax Reform Act of 1986 induded a variant of this through its provisionto restrict interest
deductions, other than mortgage interest payments, to investmentincome. Individuals can96Gordon & Slemrod
amounts in taxes simply by using theirinterest-bearing assets to reduce any
debts. Individuals still receiving net interest incomewould find, as under
the current law, that bonds are the most heavilytaxed asset. Individuals
with net interest deductions, however, wouldfind investments in the
retirement of outstanding loans to be tax free,therefore among the most
lightly taxed assets. These sharp differences inthe relative attractiveness of
investments in bonds would create particularlylarge tax arbitrage oppor-
tunities, with taxes falling substantially when netlenders exchange bonds
with net borrowers in return for almost anyother asset. This arbitrage
would therefore take the form of those in debt goingshort in some other
asset and using the proceeds to repay theirloans. Such transactions do not
occur much now, since taxesdiscourage them, but presumably financial
innovations would quickly occur to facifitatethis form of tax arbitrage. As
a result, it is difficult toforecast with any confidence the implications of
such a tax change.
3. EXPLORATION OF THE DATA
We begin our study of alternative systems ofcapital income taxation by first
calculating the effects of a tax change assuming nochanges in reported
income. Thus, we ignore price effects,behavioral responses to the tax
change, and changes in income from equity resultingfrom the changes in
the corporate tax law. In section 4, we discussthe likely implications of
these complications for our results.
In calculating the effects of a tax change, we usedata on the 1983 income
tax returns of a representative crosssection of 29,821 individuals made
available by the Treasury. We forecast how tax revenueand the after-tax
income of different types of individuals wouldhave been changed had the
1983 tax law included the proposed modifications, inorder to understand
the historic effects of the tax treatment of interestincome, and of capital
income generally.
To provide some sense of the distributionalimplications of these tax
changes, we need a measure of how well offpeople were initially. One
straightforward approach is to use the value of adjusted grossincome
(ACT) reported on the individual's tax return. Acrucial problem with this
figure, however, is that it measures in part the extent towhich individuals
have made use of tax arbitrage to reduce their taxableincomea number of
seemingly very rich individuals end up with verylow ACT through clever
use of the tax law. Academicshave normally focused on the present value
get around this restriction, however, to the extentthat they can use their interest-bearing
assets to repay existing debt, or they can reclassifyexisting debt as a mortgage. Only to the
extent that these simple remedies are insufficient will thefollowing discussion apply.Do We Collect any Revenue from Taxing Capital Income?97
of lifetime income as a more reasonable measure of economic welfare;a
commonly proposed alternative is comprehensive income. Neithercan be
calculated with any degree of reliability from the existing data. The
measure of well-being we employ is our best estimate of labor income.
Labor income has the advantage of being relatively stable over an indivi-
dual's lifetime, so it is highly correlated with a true measure of the present
value of the individual's lifetime income. However, labor income wifi not
be an accurate measure of economic position for those who are retired or
for those who have yet to enter the labor force full time. We therefore treat
separately any households who report a member over age 65 or who
indicate on their tax return that they are being claimed as a dependent on
someone else's tax return. For purposes of comparison with other studies
of the distributional impact of tax law changes, we also report some of the
results broken down by AGI brackets instead of by labor income brackets.
In Tables 1-2, we report our estimates of interest income and payments,
other capital income, and various other components that enter into the
calculation of individual tax liabifities in 1983, by labor income group. Table
1 reports the aggregate figures across returns in each income group, and
Table 2 reports the average value per return. (Tables la and 2a report the
same figures by ACT brackets.) Given the limited information available
from the Treasury, some items had to be estimated. The procedures we
employed to make these estimates are described in detail in the appendix.
For example, partnership net income, but not the interest deductions of a
partnership, was reported in the tax file. To estimate interest deductions,
we multiplied reported net income by the ratio of interest deductions to net
income observed in the aggregate data in the 1983 statistics of income for
partnerships, doing this separately for partnerships with positive versus
negative net income. Also, in constructing the figures for itemized deduc-
tions in columns 8 and 9, we defined column 9 as the amount of extra
deductions allowed, beyond the standard deduction, due to the availabffity
of all itemized deductions except for interest payments, whereas column 8
measures the additional deduction available due to the deductibility of
interest payments. Therefore, the sum of columns 7 and 8 equals the
additional deductions taken, beyond the standard deduction, by itemizers.
We also report in column 1 of Tables 3-4 net interest income (income less
payments) by labor income group, and in column 2 of Tables 3-4 we report
net taxable capital income, defined to equal the sum of net interest income
and other capital income, including the capital income component of
self-employment income as derived by the procedure described in the
There are some complications in measuring the labor income of the self-employed, which are















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Changes in Aggregate Income and Taxes
(millions of 1983 dollars)
Policy I Policy 2
Net Change Change in
Labor Netcapital + Change inin totalChange total
income interestinteresttaxable tax in taxable tax
group incomeincomeincomeliabilityincome liability
Policy 1 involves reducing all interest income and deductions by 40percent.
Policy 2 involves eliminating all interest and capital income anddeductions (columns
3,4,5,8, and 14 in Table 1 are zeroed out).
appendix. Table 3 reports the aggregate figures, and Table 4 reportsthe
average of these values per return. As canbe seen looking at the last row
of Table 3, allowing interest payments to be deductedand making interest
income taxable results in a drop in aggregatepersonal taxable income of
$17.8 billion. Only individuals in the lowest labor income group,the elderly
and dependents, have higher taxable income due tothe existing tax
freatment of interest income and interest payments.
In fact, we estimate that individuals on their tax returnsreport $30.0
billion more in interest payments than they report ininterest income.10 If
the economy were closed and all interest incomeand payments were
reported on tax returns, then this figure should equal the sumof net
corporate and federal government interest payments.In 1983, according to
the data in the Economic report of the president, net interest paymentsby the
federal government were $94.3 billion, whereas the 1983 statisticsof income
for corporations indicates that corporations (includingfinancial institutions)
on net received $19.5 bfflion ininterest income. Therefore, net interest
payments by the government and corporationstogether equaled $74.8
billion. Yet we estimate that individuals on net reportmaking interest
° Their taxable income falls by only $17.8 billion, however, since those who itemize so as to
claim personal interest deductions lose use of the standard deduction.
6,28733,351-3,036-1,038-30,037-7,156
-37,574-27,231 17,048 3,570 26,649 6,150
-34,812-23,644 14,334 4,392 23,569 7,755
-8,934-3,589 3,517 1,393 3,539 1,465
-13,420 3,435 5,326 2,401 -3,254-1,044
68,475113,017-27,361-5,924-104,778-22,086
2,151 3,261-1,278 -113 -4,729 -329
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TABLE 4
Changes in In come and Taxes Per Return
(1983 dollars)
Policy I Policy 2
Net Change Change
Labor Net capital +Changein totalChangein total









Policy 1 involves reducing all interest income and deductions by 40percent.
Policy 2 involves eliminating all interest and capital income anddeductions (columns
3,4,5,8, and 14 in Table 1 are zeroed Out).
payments of $30.0 billion, On net, therefore, interest income of$104.8
billion should be received by a variety of nontaxpayinginstitutions and
individuals, such as pension funds, IRAs,company savings plans, non-
profit organizations, and state and localgovernments, as well as individ-
uals who do not report interest incomeor payments because their income
is too low, they do not itemize, or they simply evadetaxes. These data
make clear that a significant amount of tax arbitrage is takingplace between
taxable and tax exempt entities, perhapseven more than between taxpay-
ers in high and low tax brackets.
In contrast, net capital income of individualsas a group, as reported on
their tax returns, is $98.6 billion. As is made clear bySteuerle (1985), this
figure is much smaller than the actual real income individualsreceive from
capital due to a wide variety of provisions in thetax code affecting the
definition of taxable income.
3.1 The Impact of Taxing Only Real Interest
We then use these data to forecast therevenue and distributional effects of
taxing only real interest payments. As a first step,we ignore any impact of
this tax change on the reported capital income figures. Weassume that the
ratio of the real interest rate to the nominal interest rate is 60percent, which
126 666 -61 -21 -600 -143
-1,579-1,144 716 150 1,119 258
-4,290-2,914 1,766 542 2,904 956
-8,685-3,489 3,419 1,355 3,441 1,424
-22,816 5,843 9,055 4,082-5,534-1,775
6,092 10,055-2,435 -527-9,323-1,965
2,339 3,553-1,398 -123-5,174 -360
-186 1,029 89 49 -929 -159104Gordon & Slemrod
was approximately true in 1983.11 Wetherefore recalculated tax liabifities
under 1983 law, including only 60 percent of reportedinterest income in
taxable income and allowing only 60 percent of reported interestpayments
as a deduction.12 Theresults are reported in columns 3 4 in Tables 3-4.
Here, we find that aggregate personal income tax revenue goes upby $4.7
billion, with the extra tax payments being made by thenonelderly in the
higher tax brackets.
If such a tax change is imposed throughout the taxcode, there would
also be a change in corporate tax liabilities. According tothe 1983 statistics
of income for corporations, net interest payments bynonfinancial corporations
as a whole, excluding SubchapterS corporations, were $96.6 billion.'3
Unfortunately, data on individual corporate tax returns are notavailable for
the calculation of how tax liabilities would change, evenignoring behav-
ioral responses, if the interest deduction were scaledback. Doing so is
complicated by the importance of loss carryforwards and carrybacksduring
this period, which imply that an accurate calculation ofthe change in a
company's income due to some tax change must take into account notonly
the revenue change in 1983 but also the effects on previousand later tax
returns arising from carrybacks or carryforwardsof 1983 tax losses. Alt-
shuler and Auerbach (1987), in a careful study usinginternal data at the
Treasury, calculated the effective marginal tax rate oninterest deductions
during the early 1980s to be 31.8 percent. Therefore,if only 60 percent of
interest deductions were allowed, the resulting rise in corporatetax
payments, ignoring any changes in prices orbehavior, would be
0.4(0.318)(96.6) = $12.3 billion. Combining this with the estimatedincrease
11In 1983, the various nominal interest rates ranged from 8.63 percentfor Treasuiy bifis to
13.55 percent for Baa corporate bonds, and the inflation rate in theCPI was 3.8 percent.
12This procedure used the tax law simulator developed at the Office of TaxPolicy Research at
the University of Michigan. In recalculating tax liabilities, numerous minorassumptions had
to be made to compensate for inadequate data in the tax file.Details concerning our procedure
are available from the authors.
One important assumption we make in trying to model such a taxchange is that the tax
treatment of banks and insurance companies would be leftunaffected. The current tax
treatment of these institutions involves a variety of speciallydesigned provisions, with the net
result being very little tax payments by these companies. We presumethat the amount of
taxes paid by financial institutions would not be allowed tofail further as part of a tax change
that would appear to raise the tax liabilities of the rest of the corporate sectorsubstantially. In
modeling this tax change, we therefore make the simplifying assumptionthat the tax
payments by banks and insurance companies would not change,and we focus only on
nonfinancial corporations, induding real estate.Do We Collect any Revenue from Taxing Capital Income?105
of$4.7billion in personal tax payments yields an initial estimate ofa$17.0
billion increase in tax revenue from taxing only real interestincome.14
3.2 The Impact of Eliminating All Taxation of Capital Income
Our next task is to forecast the effects of shifting toa tax system that does
not distort savings and capital investment decisions. Thiscan be done
either by exempting capital income from tax entirelyor by allowing new
investments to be expensed and then taxing at ordinary ratesany resulting
cash flow from the investments, including the sales price if theassets are
sold.' We implement this tax by first exempting from taxation allfinancial
income from investments (e.g., dividends and capital gains,as well as
interest income). For all other real investments,we replace interest deduc-
tions, depreciation deductions, and the investment tax creditwith a
deduction for expenditures on new capital in thatyear. 16 The details of this
procedure are available in the appendix; it is the same procedure used in
separating labor income from capital income. Therefore, in forecasting the
effects of this tax change, we zero out net capital income,as reported in
column2of Tables3-4or in the sum of columns3-5minus column7in
Tables1-2,from taxable income and eliminate the investment tax credit.
The resulting change in tax payments is shown in column6 in Tables3-4.
Here, we find that personal tax payments fall by$15.2billion. On a
per-capita basis, the elderly and the highest income group gain consider-
ably. In contrast, those with labor incomes between$20,000and $100,000
pay more in taxes, since as a group they had negative taxable capital
income.
In implementing this tax, we assume that thesame shift to a modified
cash-flow tax, requiring expensing of new investment, is made underthe
corporate tax as well.17 Our basic strategy was to replace depreciation
Attempting a similar calculation for 1982, Steuerle (1985) found thatrevenue would rise by
$29 billion if all interest income and deductions were eliminated from taxation.Steuerle did
not provide sufficient information about his procedures to reconcile the differences.
The Treasuiy's Blueprints for tax reform, in describing howa tax that would not distort
savings and investment decisions might be implemented, recommended usinga combination
of these two procedures, giving taxpayers the discretion in mostcases concerning the
procedure to be used.
16In addition, we eliminate the depletion deduction,as would occur under a cash-flow tax.
17Under our approach, real assets would be taxed based on their cash flow, butany cash flow
from financial assets would be tax exempt. This approach correspondedto the R-base
described in the Meade Committee report. Under this type of tax change, thereis no
important windfall to owners of existing capital, since they continue to face thesame tax rate
on future income, and there is no change in the taxation of pure profitsor any important
change in the allocation of risk between investors and the government.106Gordon & Slemrod
deductions and interest deductions by a deduction equal tothe amount of
new corporate investmentthat occurred in 1983 and to eliminate the
investment tax credit. A variety of other changeswould also be called for in
shifting to a cash-flow tax. In particular, expendituresthat are amortized
should be expensed the same as for depreciable assets.Expenditures on
inventories should also be expensed rather than having adeduction made
when goods are taken out of inventory. In addition, thedepletion deduc-
tion should be eliminated. Finally, we eliminatethe tax on dividend income
and capitall gains received by corporations.18
On net, we find that under a cash-flow corporate tax,taxable corporate
income of nonfinancial corporations wouldincrease by $26.8 billion
interest deductions of $96.6 bfflion would beeliminated, but this change
would be mostly offset by allowing expensing rather thandepreciation of
new investments and by eliminating anytax on financial income. Based on
an effective marginal corporate tax rateof 0.318, tax payments by these
companies would rise by $8.5 billion. When we alsoeliminate the invest-
ment tax credit and take into account likelychanges in foreign tax credits,19
tax revenue from nonfinancial corporations goes upby $20.8 billion. We
further assume that when income from all financial assets ismade tax
exempt, financial institutions would nolonger owe any tax. In 1983,
financial institutions paid $7.1 billion in taxes. Therefore,when we take
into account the loss of this tax revenuefrom financial institutions, we
forecast that aggregate corporate tax paymentswould rise by $13.7 billion.
Considering both the corporate and individual taxes,adopting this
modified consumption tax leads to a fall in tax revenueof $1.5 bfflion. This
is in contrast to a revenue rise of $17.0 billionif the only change enacted
were to tax real rather thannominal interest, a change pushing the tax
system much closer to a comprehensive income tax.Note, though, that
these calculations assume that the figures reported on the taxreturns do
not change, whether due to behavioral responses,price changes, or
changes in individual income from equity reflectingthe corporate tax
changes; the calculations also ignore the effect of adrop in the market
18A detailed description of our procedure is provided in the appendix.
Historically, U.S. operations abroad have paid little or no taxes uponthe repatriation of
earnings because enough foreign taxes had been paid on theseearnings that the foreign tax
credit virtually completely offset any taxes due. We make theconservative assumption that
this would continue to be true, even after these tax changes aremade, implying that the
foreign tax credit should increase to offset any extra taxes due onforeign source income. Since
we have no direct data on the size of foreign sourceincome, we assume simply that the
foreign tax credit offsets the same percentage of the forecasted changein tax revenue that it
does of aggregate tax revenue (precredits) prior to the tax change.Taking this correction into
account, we find that corporate tax revenue (precredits)would change by only $6.7 billion
rather than by $8.5 billion.Do We Collect any Revenue from Taxing Capital Income?107
interest rate on government interest payments. Addressing theseissues is
the objective of the next section.
4. IMPLICATIONS OF PRICE AND BEHAVIORAL
RESPONSES TO TAX CHANGES
Contrary to the maintained assumption of the previous section,we believe
that if either policy were implemented there would be importantshifts in
portfolios and in rates of return. Furthermore,we have not yet taken into
account the losses to individuals arising from the change in corporatetax
payments. In this section, we briefly discuss and presentsome preliminary
estimates of how the results in section 3 would change whensome of these
complications are taken into account.
4.1 Incidence of the Increase in Corporate Tax Payments
In our analysis in section 3 of the distributional impact of thesetwo tax
changes, we ignored any impact of changes in corporatetax payments on
individuals' pretax income, and the secondary implications ofany changes
in pretax income on individual tax payments. Since the incidenceof the
corporate tax is heavily debated, there is no single agreedway to proceed.
We adopted the natural starting point of assuming that the lossesfrom
these extra corporate taxes are borne by individuals inproportion to their
ownership of equity. Since we do not observe asset holdingsin the
Treasury's file of income tax returns,we also assume that the value of the
corporate equity owned by an individual is proportional to hisor her
dividend income.2021
These changes in equity income are taxable only to theextent that they
are received by individuals directly and take the form of dividendsor
reali7ed capital gains. Whenwe allocate the drop in corporate after-tax
income to individuals in proportion to their dividends,we assume that the
fraction of this drop in after-tax income that is reflected directlyin lower-
dividend receipts equals the observed aggregate ratio of dividendincome
20To the extent that the dividend-price ratio is loweron the equity owned by higher-tax-
bracket individuals, our procedure attributes too little of the burden of the increasedcorporate
tax payments to these higher-tax-bracket individuals.
21Not all dividends are received by individuals and reportedon their tax returns. Pension
funds, in particular, are large holders of corporate equity. Weassume for simplicity that these
pension funds are entirely defined-benefit plans, so any changes in their incomeare borne by
corporations, and so by equity owners, rather than by pension recipients. In attributing allthe
increased corporate taxes to individual equity holders, however,we ignore other nontaxable
owners of equity, for example, foreigners and nonprofit institutions.108Gordon & Slemrod
TABLE 5
Changes in Aggregate Income and Taxes due to Personal andCorporate
Tax Changes
(millions of1983dollars)
Policy I Policy 2
Change
Labor Change inChange Change in Change in Change inin after-
income total taxin pretaxafter-taxtotal taxpretax tax
group liabilityincomeincome liabilityincomeincome
Policy 1 involves reducing all interest income and deductions by 40 percent.
Policy 2 involves eliminating all interest and capital income and deductions (columns
3,4,5,8, and 14 in Table 1 are zeroed Out).
of individuals to corporate after-tax profits.The remaining extra corporate
tax payments should show up as reduced capital gains toshareholders. We
assume arbitrarily that the ratio of realizedcapital gains to accrued capital
gains is 1/4, resulting in an effective accrual-equivalent tax rate oncapital
gains of 10 percent of the individual's ordinary tax rate.23
Tables 5 and 6 take account of our attempt to allocate the changes in
corporate tax payments to individuals. Here, we report notonly the
changes in individual tax payments, which now reflect thechanges in
dividend income and realized capital gains caused by the higher corporate
According to the 1986 economic report of the president, 1983 corporate profits after tax, with
inventory valuation and capital consumption adjustments, were $136.8 billion,and dividend
receipts reported on individual income tax returns totaled $50.4 billion. Weassumed that the
drop in taxable dividends equaled 36.8 percent (=100X50.41136.8) of any extra corporate tax
payments.
23 The 1/4 ratio could be obtained, for example, by assuming that half of capital gains escapes
taxation by being passed along upon the death of the recipient, and thatthe effective
reali7atlon rate is further halved by the discretion shareholders have to postponerealizing
capital gains, perhaps to years with lower tax rates, and to hasten realizing capital losses.
Because only 40 percent of long-term capital gains were taxable upon realization in 1983,the
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TABLE 6
Changes in Income and Taxes Per Return dueto Personal and
Corporate Tax Changes
(1983 dollars)
Policy :1 Policy 2
Change ChangeChange Change
Labor in totalChangein after-in totalChangein after-
income taxin pretax tax tax in pretax tax
group liabilityincomeincomeliabilityincomeincome
Policy 1 involves reducing all interest income and deductionsby 40 percent.
Policy 2 involves eliminating all interest and capital incomeand deductions (columns
3,4,5,8, and 14 in Table 1 are zeroed out).
tax payments, but also the changes in pretax income of individualsarising
from the drop in their dividend income andcapital gains, whether realized
or unrealized. The net changes in their after-tax income under thetwo
policy experiments are reported in columns 3 and 6,respectively. Under
the tax on real rather than nominal interestincome, tax payments fall
relative to what was reported in Tables 3 4, sincedividend and capital
gains income has dropped for all incomegroups. In aggregate, tax revenue
is now forecasted to go up by $2.9 billion rather than by$4.7 billion, as
reported earlier. Since, pretax income has fallen inaggregate by the $12.3
billion more that would be paid in corporatetaxes, however, we now find
that all income groups except the elderly and dependentssuffer a drop in
after-tax income, with the size of the drop increasingwith income.
Under the modified cash-flow tax, the fall in dividend andcapital gains
income has no effect on tax payments since, under thistax, dividend and
capital gains are not taxable anyway. But pretax income fallsby the $13.7
billion more paid in corporate taxes. Inaggregate, individuals now gain
only $1.5 billion. But this aggregate gain is dividedvery unevenly. In
particular, the elderly gain $14.8 billion, dependents and the lowestincome
group gain, but the intermediate income groups lose.
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4.2 The Effects of Changes in the Market InterestRate
Implementing these policies wifi undoubtedly affectthe equilibrium pretax
rates of return earned on various assetsand result in changes in individual
behavior. Any serious attempt to forecast these effectswould require an
elaborate general equilibrium model, which we do not attemptto construct
here.24 Both types of complications must beconsidered when estimating
the revenue effects of a tax change, but whenfocusing on the gains or
losses to individuals from a tax change, behavioralchanges can be ignored,
at least when the tax change is small.For example, before the tax change,
the individual might borrow to buy more lightlytaxed equity until the
implicit cost of bearing yet more risk from such ahighly leveraged position
just offsets the tax savings from further arbitrage.After a small tax change,
the individual may modify his or her portfolioslightly, but the gains and
losses from doing so still almost exactly offset eachother. We therefore
focus on the effects of price changes, particularly onthe implications of
changes in the market interest rate.26
What would be a plausible response of the marketinterest rate if only
real interest income were subject to tax? In the newequilibrium, the
magnitude of the fall in the interest rate would justbalance the decreased
demand for loans by investors with above-averagetax rates (whose
after-tax cost of borrowing rises) and the decreaseddemand for bonds by
foreigners and by investors with below-average tax rates(for both of whom
the lower rate of tax does not fully compensate forthe fall in the interest
rate.) We assume, arbitrarily, that an investor in the20 percent tax bracket
wifi be left indifferent to the combined effects of thechange in the market
interest rate and the change in the tax lawthosein higher tax brackets wifi
then face higher net borrowing costs, and those inlower tax brackets will
face a lower net return on bonds. This implies thatif the initial nominal
24See Slemrod (1983) for a general equilibrium model with endogenousportfolio decisions. In
the construction of such a model, it would be important totake into account the effects of these
tax changes on international capital flows. Inparticular, when interest is taxed less heavily,
domestic investors would tend to buy more bonds fromforeigners in exchange for other
assets.
This useful result from economic theory is often referred to asthe envelope condition.
26In general, all rates of return will change in response toeither policy change. However, it
would be difficult to forecast the direction of change in other ratesof return, let alone come up
with a reasonable guess of the size of the change. For example, itis difficult to forecast the
effects of either policy change on aggregate savings, sinceincentives to save go up for those
in high tax brackets, but down for those in low taxbrackets, soit is unclear whether aggregate
investment goes up or down. Similarly, changes in the relative ratesof return earned by
different types of capital depend on differences in the degree towhich different types of capital
are affected by these tax changes. We havechosen in this study to focus only on the effects of
changes in interest rates.Do We Collect any Revenue from Taxing Capital Income?111
interest rate is r, the interest rate that must prevail when real interest is
taxable, which we denote by r1, will satisfy (1-0.2)r = [l(0.2)(0.6)]r1.
Hence r1Ir = 0.909, implying a fall in the nominal interest rate of 9.1
percent. Similarly, if a modified cash-flow tax were introduced, under this
assumption the new market interest rate, r2, would satisfy (1 0.2)r =
implying a 20 percent fall in the market interest rate.
To the degree that the interest rate falls, the government will pay less in
interest on its debt. In particular, according to the 1986 economic report of the
president, the federal government paid on net $94.3 bfflion in interest. If the
nominal interest rate were to fall by 9.1 percent, the government would
save $8.6 billion in interest payments; if it fell 20 percent, the savings would
be $18.9 billion.27
In addition, however, interest income and deductions shrink furtheron
individual and corporate tax forms. Under the first tax proposal, this fall in
the market interest rate would cause tax revenue to rise just as it did when
we lowered taxable interest income and deductions by statute. In particu-
lar, the interest deductions of nonfinancial corporations would shrink by
9.1 percent pretax. Since only 60 percent of these payments are deductible,
the tax payments of these corporations would rise by (0.318)[96.6-
(0.6)(0.909)(96.6)] = $14.0 billion, instead of by $12.3 billion. Since these
corporations save (0.091)(96.6) = $8.8 billion in interest payments, how-
ever, the net drop in their after-tax income is only $5.2 billion.28 However,
financial corporations receive on net $116.5 billion in interest income. If the
interest rate falls by 9.1 percent while, by assumption, their tax payments
remain unchanged, then their after-tax income falls by $10.6 billion.
Therefore, the after-tax income of the corporate sector as a whole falls by
$15.8 billion.
Under the modified cash-flow tax, this fall in the market interest rate
would not affect corporate tax payments since interest payments are not
deductible. However, interest payments by nonfinancial corporations
would fall by (0.2)($96.6) = $19.3 billion. Since their taxes are stifi forecasted
to rise by $20.8 billion, their after-tax income should fall by $1.5 billion.
Applying this same procedure to financial corporations would imply that
27We ignore here the fact that some of the existing government debt is noncallable long-term
debt, implying that the fall in the market interest rate will not immediately save the
government money on this part of its existing debt. Our intention is to capture the effect of the
tax change in a representative future year rather than to measure the impact of the tax change
in the year of enactment.
28As with government debt, some corporation debt is long term, implying to that extent that
a fall in the market interest rate may not affect interest payments. However, since much of
corporate long-term debt is either at a floating interest rate or callable, the fall in the interest
rate should reduce corporate interest payments on all its existing debt very quickly.112Gordon & Sleinrod
TABLE 7
Changes in Aggregate Income and Taxes Due to Personal Tax,
Corporate Tax, and Interest Rate Changes
(millions of 1983 dollars)
Policy I Policy 2
Change
Labor in totalChange in Change in Change in Change in Change in










Policy 1 involves reducing all interest income and deductions by 40 percent.
Policy 2 involves eliminating all interest and capital income and deductions (columns
3,4,5,8, and 14 in Table 1 are zeroed Out).
their before-tax profits would fall by 20 percent of their net interest income
of $116.5 billion, or by $23.3 billion. Since their tax payments of $7.1 billion
are eliminated under this tax change, the after-tax incomeof financial
corporations falls by $16.2 billion, implying that the after-tax income of the
corporate sector as a whole falls by $17.7 billion.
Finally, we calculate how individual tax payments and after-tax income
change, now taking into account the drop in the market interest rate. To do
this, we take into account the drop in interest receipts and payments
reported on individual income tax returns, the change in income from
equity due to the increase in corporate taxes, and the implications for
individuals of the drop in interest income on any nontaxable holdings of
bonds in corporate and state and local pension funds, Keogh and IRA
accounts, and the drop in interest income on taxable bonds held directly by
state and local governments. The assumptions we make in allocating these
changes in interest income to individuals are described in the appendix.
The resulting changes in individual tax payments and after-tax income
are reported in Tables 7-8. Here, we find thatunder the first policy, as a
result of the fall in dividends and the increase in state and local taxes, to
cover the fall in interest earnings on taxable bonds held by stateand local
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TABLE 7a
Changes in Aggregate In come and Taxes Due to Personal Tax,
Corporate Tax, and Interest Rate Changes
(millions of 1983 dollars)
Policy TI Policy 2
Change ChangeChange Change
Adjustedin totalChangein after-in totalChangein after-
gross tax in pretax tax tax in pretax tax
income liabilityincomeincome liabilityincomeincome
Policy 1 involves reducing all interest income and deductions by 40 percent.
Policy 2 involves eliminating all interest and capital income and deductions (columns
3,4,5,8, and 14 in Table 1 are zeroed out).
TABLE 8
Changes in Income and Taxes Per Return Due to Personal Tax,
Corporate Tax, and Interest Rate Changes
(1983 dollars)
Policy I Policy 2
Change ChangeChange Change
Labor in totalChangein after-in totalChangein after-
income tax in pretax tax tax in pretax tax
group liabilityincome income liabilityincomeincome
Policy 1 involves reducing all interest income and deductions by 40 percent.
Policy 2 involves eliminating all interest and capital income and deductions (columns
3,4,5,8, and 14 in Table 1 are zeroed Out).
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Changes in Income and Taxes Per Return Due to Personal Tax,
Corporate Tax, and Interest Rate Changes
(1983 dollars)
Policy I Policy 2
Change ChangeChange
Adjustedin totalChangein after-in totalChange in Change in
gross taxin pretax tax tax pretax after-tax
income liabilityincomeincomeliability income income
Policy 1 involves reducing all interest income and deductions by 40 percent.
Policy 2 involves eliminating all interest and capital income and deductions (columns
3,4,5,8, and 14 in Table 1 are zeroed out).
individuals also suffer a fall of $23.2 in pretax income, implying that their
after-tax income falls by $26.1 billion. By construction, this loss equals the
gains to the government and to foreignersthe government now receives
$14.0 billion more in corporate tax revenue, $2.9 billion more in personal tax
revenue, and saves $8.6 billion in interest payments on itsdebt, for a total
revenue gain of $25.5 billion; foreigners now pay $0.5bfflion less in interest
on their net debt to U.S. residents.29 (To the extentthat behavioral changes
result in an efficiency gain, ignored in deriving these numbers, the losses to
individuals would be less than the revenue gains to the government and
foreigners.) We stifi find that all income groups share in this loss, with the
burden increasing quickly across labor income groups.
Under the modified cash-flow tax, personal tax payments still fall by
$15.2 billionthe change in interest or dividend income does not affect tax
liabifities under this tax, though there is a minor change in state and local
tax deductions for itemizers. However, pretax income fallsby $33.9 billion,
and after-tax income falls by $18.7 billion. As in the previous case, this fall
reflects the gains to the government and foreigners. The government now
receives $13.7 bfflion in exfra corporate taxes, loses $15.2 billion in personal
29In each of the examples, rounding error leads to minor variation in the figures.
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taxes, but saves $18.9 billion in interest payments, for a net revenue gain of
$17.4 billion; foreigners save $1.2 billion in interest payments to U.S.
residents. Our figures suggest that all income groups share in this loss
except for the highest income group, which gains substantially from the tax
change since it has high capital income that isnow exempt from tax. Many
writers have forecast large efficiency gains from a move to a cash-flow tax,
however, and these figures ignore such efficiency gains.
Tables 7a and 8a provide the same information but are dividedamong
income groups based on initial ACT. These figures are closely consistent
with those in Tables 7-8.
4.3 Behavioral Responses
Either of these tax changes should also result in a variety of behavioral
responses of both individuals and corporations. When forecasting the
revenue effects of these tax changes, one must take these behavioral
responses into account.3°
Under our modified cash-flow tax, however, these behavioralresponses
will have little or no effect on tax revenue. Under this tax, financial assets
are tax exempt, so who owns how much in financial assets has no
implications directly for tax revenue. In addition, investments in real assets
may change the timing of tax payments, but at least marginal investments
should have no impact on the present value of taxrevenue under a cash-
flow tax. Any capital deepening should raise thewage rate and, therefore,
taxable labor income and tax revenue, but only after enough time has
passed to allow for significant capital accumulation.
When real rather than nominal interest income is taxed, behavioral
responses would likely cause a further rise in tax revenue. To begin with,
under this tax change, the portfolio composition of investors should change
so as to raise tax revenue. Higher-tax-bracket individuals would reduce
their debt to both foreigners and low-tax-bracket investors, and would sell
in exchange less heavily taxed assets to these other investors. By domestic
investors as a group owning more heavily taxed bonds, shiftingsome
lightly taxed assets to foreigners, tax revenue rises.3' In addition,rearrang-
ing the portfolios of domestic investors, shifting heavily taxed bonds to
high-tax-bracket investors and less taxed assets to low-tax-bracket inves-
tors, causes tax revenue to rise further.
3°Although we have argued above that, at least to a first approximation, the welfare
implications of behavioral responses can be ignored, their revenue implications need to be
taken into account.
31This type of international portfolio response to a domestic tax change is examined atgreater
length in Gordon (1986).116Gordon & Slemrod
The composition of the capital stock should also change so as to raise tax
revenue. Capital should shift out of housing and otherlightly taxed assets
(including tax shelters) purchased by those in high tax brackets, due to the
rise in their opportunity cost of funds, and into a broader rangeof more
heavily taxed assets preferred by those in lower tax brackets, causing a
further rise in tax revenue.
The effects of this tax change on the aggregate rate of savings and capital
accumulation is less clear. Higher-tax-bracket individuals would now earn
a higher after-tax rate of return on bonds, so theywould have an increased
incentive to save; conversely lower-tax-bracket individuals would face a
reduced incentive to save. Aggregate effects are unclear. If the interest rate
falls by only 9.1 percent, as we have arbitrarily assumed, then investment
incentives of corporations and other higher-tax-bracket investors would fall
slightly, but this inference would reverse if the fall in the interest rate were
slightly larger.
In addition, the effects of given changes in savings and investment on tax
revenue may be small, at least in the short run.We find here that a
modified cash-flow tax, in which savings and investment decisions are
totally tax exempt at the margin, would collect $17.4 billion more revenue
than the existing tax system, thus suggesting that savings and investment
are now on average slightly subsidized. If we were tomodify the existing
tax system by taxing real rather than nominal interest income,then under
this revised tax system savings and investment may on average be very
slightly taxed; we forecast slightly higher tax revenue when this policy is
enacted than when the modified cash-flow tax is enacted. However, since
the average tax rate on savings and investment seems to be so small,
changes in savings and investment rates should have little effect on tax
revenue.
5. EFFICIENCY EFFECTS OF CHANGES INCAPITAL
TAXATION
Either of the policy changes we consider wifi result in behavioral changes
that are likely to have a beneficial effect on the efficiency of the economy.
By design, the second policy change eliminates all distortions to savings
and investment decisions, whereas the first change reduces the tax rate on
the most heavily taxed asset toward the effective tax rates on other assets.
These efficiency gains would either improve government revenue further
or reduce the net loss to individuals We do not attempt,however, to
estimate the size or incidence of these efficiency gains.
Either policy change should cause an improvement in how risk isDo We Collect any Revenue from Taxing Capital Income?117
allocated among individuals The current tax systemcauses the portfolios
of high-tax individuals to feature relatively risky claimson real capital and
causes the portfolios of low-tax individuals to contain mostly relatively
riskless interest-bearing securities. The result is that market risk is borne
more heavily by upper-income individuals than is efficient. Taxing only
real interest will induce a more efficient spreading of risk by lessening the
tax distortions to portfolio composition. Abolishing all taxation of capital
income wifi completely eliminate tax-induced distortions in risk-bearing.
Either policy change would also probably improve the sectoral allocation
of real capital. Although our shift to a tax on real rather than nominal
interest income still leaves in place various distortions to the composition of
capital, it lowers the attractiveness of various tax-sheltered activities. The
shift to a modified cash-flow tax eliminates any distortions to the allocation
of capital.32
Assessing the intertemporal efficiency implications of thesetax policies
requires two steps: first, to understand how they affect the incentiveto
postpone consumption until the future; second, to understand whether
such incentive changes are desirable. We leave the second step, which has
been central to the academic debate on the comprehensiveversus con-
sumption tax, aside to focus on the first.
Both policy changes reduce the tax rates on various forms of capital
income, suggesting that at the initial interest rate there isan increased
incentive to save by individuals but a decrease in the incentive to invest due
to the rise in the opportunity cost of funds. As a result, the interestrate has
to fall to bring investment and savings (plus net capital inflows from
abroad) back into equality. Since in equffibrium the after-tax interestrate
will fall for those in low tax brackets and rise for those in hightax brackets,
effects on savings and direct investments, in owner-occupied housing,for
example, wifi differ across income groups. Whether, inaggregate, invest-
ment rises or falls depends on the interest elasticity of savings plus
international capital flows relative to that of investment. At this point, the
empirical evidence is not adequate to allow any good forecast.
How might savings and investment increase asa result of changes in the
tax treatment of capital income that raise government revenue? Onepart of
the answer lies in distinguishing theaverage return on a taxpayer's
portfolio from the marginal return to an additional dollar of savings. That
these measures may be different is best illustrated byan example. Consider
32We have argued that under a cash-flow tax, the present value of taxrevenue from a
marginal investment is zero. As a result, a cash-flow tax should not distortsavings or
investment decisions. This result assumes, however, that the individual's tax rate isconstant
over time. When the individual's tax rate changes over time, there wifi still be some distortion
to savings and investment decisions.118Gordon & Sleinrod
a high-tax-bracket taxpayer in aninflationary environment. The real
after-tax return on bonds, and therefore the real cost of borrowing, may
very well be negative. Suppose the taxpayer canborrow to buy equity until,
at the margin, the higher expected return on equityis just offset by the
implicit extra cost of holding an even riskier portfolio. Then,when this
individual considers saving more, the available return on equity, taking
into account the extra risk-bearing cost, just equals theavailable after-tax
real rate of return on bonds. Given taxes on nominal interest income,this
net return can be very low even though the average return onthe
individual's portfolio, ignoring the costs of risk bearing, can be very high.
Through borrowing to buy equity, this taxpayer gains on inframarginal
arbitrage and is left indifferent at the margin, whereas the arbitrageresults
in a loss of tax revenue. In this context, cutting the tax rate oninterest
income increases the cost of borrowing and causes areduction in the
amount of such arbitrage and a gain in tax revenuefrom this individual.
However, in spite of these higher tax payments, the individualfaces an
increased marginal incentive to save.
The after-tax return on bonds does not reflect the marginal return to
saving if arbitrage gains are limited by a borrowing constraint that istied to
wealth. In this case, saving an additional dollar relaxes the borrowing
constraint by some amount. The value to the individual of this relaxation of
the borrowing constraint should be included in the marginal return to
saving.
6. TRANSITION LOSSES
Our calculations of the revenue effects of shifting to amodified cash-flow
tax involve replacing depreciation, amortization,depletion, and inventory
deductions that took place under the 1983 law with those that wouldtake
place under a cash-flow tax. If a cash-flow tax had first beenintroduced in
1983, however, presumably businesses would havebeen allowed to
continue to take deductions on existing assets, even as they expense new
purchases of assets. Only when the allowed deductions on existing assets
are fully exhausted, therefore, would tax revenueequal the figure we
report. During the transition period, it would belower as businesses
continue to depreciate and amortize old capital at the same time as they
expense new capital.
To calculate the net revenue effects of shifting to a cash-flow tax, we
therefore should take into account these likely revenue losses during the
transition period as well as the revenue gains that occur later. The size of
these transition losses would depend on the transition rules built into any
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revenue gain also depends on assumptions about discountrates and
growth rates that determine the relative importanceof the one-time
revenue loss and the permanent revenue gain.
In the appendix, we providea rough calculation of the present value of
these transition losses compared with thepresent value of the long-run
revenue gains. In doing so, we assume that depreciation and amortization
deductions continue on existing capital under theprevious formulae and
that depletion deductionscease with the enactment of the new law. We
also presume that existing stocks of inventoriescan eventually be written
off even as deductions are taken fornew additions to inventories, but that
the transition rules will delay these write-offson average for five years.
Under these assumptions,we find that the long-run revenue gains in
present value are more than double therevenue losses that occur due to
plausible transition rules, though the exact relation wifi bequite sensitive to
a variety of the assumed parameter values. On average, therefore,new
savings and investment are slightly subsidized during thetime period even
if they were taxed at the margin.33
7. THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986
All of our results describe the effects of possible changesto the tax law of
1983. Of course, since 1983 major changes in thetax law have been enacted.
Several features of the Tax Reform Act of 1986move the tax law in the
direction suggested by this study. The findings of this chapterindicate that
the gains from the move in this directionmay be substantial, and that
further moves in that direction are likely to be beneficialas well.
Among the changes made in the tax law that reduce therevenue loss
from tax arbitrage are the following:
Flattening the dispersion of individual's marginaltax rates and lowering
the statutory corporate tax rate.
Fully taxing capital gains.34
Reducing the dispersion in the effective tax rateson real capital by
eliminating the investment tax credit and deceleratingdepreciation
allowances for real estate.
Although we forecast that tax revenue increases in present value with thisshift to a
modified cash-flow tax, even taking plausible transition rules intoaccount, however, tax
revenue would drop substantially initially as new investments are expensed and oldassets
continue to be depreciated.
This change in the capital gains tax also reduces the attractiveness of churningassets to
increase depreciation deductions. See Gordon, Hines, and Summers (1986)for further
discussion.120Gordon & Slemrod
4. Directly reducing arbitrage opportunitiesfor state and local govern-
ments.
In addition, the drop in the nominal interest ratethrough the reduction in
the inflation rate makes tax arbitrage less valuableand less important.
8. CONCLUSIONS
By 1983 the arbitrage possibifities inherent in our systemof differentially
taxing different individuals and different formsof capital income had
grown so large that abandoningentirely any attempt to tax capital income
while leaving the tax law otherwise unchangedwould have resulted in a
slight rise in government revenue. Many haveargued that this change
would provide an important improvement in efficiency.Here, we find that
the main beneficiaries of such a tax change would bethose in the highest
income group who have very large capital incomes.Our estimates do not
take into account, however, the distributional effects ofeither the increased
government revenue or the efficiency gains.
A more modest change in the system of capitalincome taxation,
subjecting real rather than nominal interest to taxation,would lead to an
even larger increase in revenueand should also provide an efficiency gain,
all at the expense mainly of those in upper tax brackets.(Again, however,
our figures ignore the incidenceof the extra government revenue or the
efficiency gains.) Although our data do not allow us to testit, we also
believe that a move to a comprehensive income tax,where all real capital
income and not just real interest income is fully taxed,would have similar
beneficial effects.
Arbitrage opportunities disappear whenever all forms ofcapital income
are taxed unifoinily,35whether they are all tax exempt, as under a
cash-flow tax, or all subject to the same tax rate as labor income, asunder
a comprehensive income tax.Our results suggest that, given the tax system
that existed in 1983, any move toward more uniform tax rates onreal capital
income would raise revenue and improve efficiency,whether the uniform
tax rate is zero, as under a consumption tax, orequal to each individual's
tax rate on labor income, as would occur under acomprehensive income
tax.
35Arbitrage opportunities also disappear if everyone is in the same tax bracketinthis case,
the relative before-tax rates of return on different assets adjust toequsli7e all after-tax rates of
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Appendix
The data available to us on the Treasury's file of individual tax returns did
not include all the information necessary to calculate interest income and
payments, to calculate cash flow from corporations, to separately identify
labor versus capital income, to calculate the ownership pattern of nontaxed
interest-bearing assets, and to calculate the likely transition losseswere a
cash-flow tax enacted. To circumvent these problems with missing data,
we used the following procedures.
Calculation of Interest Income and Payments.The tax file includes inter-
est income reported on form 1040 or Schedule B and itemized interest
deductions reported on Schedule A. However, individuals can also report
interest deductions or receipts in a variety of other places in their tax
returns. In each case, we used information from the published Statistics of
income data to estimate the likely size of these figures for each tax return.
The procedures used varied by tax form.
For example, net partnership income is reported on the tax file data set,
but there is no detail provided about the various sources of incomeor
deductions used in calculating net income. However, in the 1983 statistics of
income are reported aggregate figures for interest income, interest deduc-
tions, and net income for partnerships in that year. The data are reported
separately for partnerships with positive net income and negative net
income. To estimate net interest, we first calculated the ratio of aggregate
net interest received to aggregate net income separately for partnerships
with net profits and losses; we then multiplied the reported net partnership
income by the appropriate ratio. Because the data for 1983 report only the
sum of interest and dividend income, and not interest separately, we
calculated interest income as a fraction of total interest and dividends in
1981 (when they were reported separately), then multiplied the 1983 figure
by this ratio to produce an estimate of interest income in thatyear.
In addition, net income reported for partnerships from rental property
and from farming are themselves taken from separate schedules filed by
the partnership. Underlying these net income figures are various income
and deduction figures, including interest deductions, whichare not re-
ported in the Statistics of income data. In these cases, we assume that these
interest deductions are the same fraction of net income that we estimate for
rental property and farms using the procedures described below.
Finally, partnerships report some net income and losses from other
partnerships and fiduciaries. We assumed that the ratio of net interest
payments to net income was the same for this income as for other
partnership income, and we solved algebraically for the appropriate ratios.122Gordon & Slemrod
The same method was used for estates and trusts, which receivedincome
from partnerships and real estate.
The same basic procedure was followed for Subchapter S corporations,
using the 1983 statistics of income data on corporate returnsof active small
business corporations, and the 1982 data on the breakdownof interest
versus dividend income; here, however, wehad one ratio for all Sub-
chapter S corporations rather than separate ratios for thosewith profits
versus losses. For Schedule C income, the sameprocedure was employed,
using data reported in the 1981 statistics of income for soleproprietorship returns
for nonfarm sole proprietorships. For Schedule E rental income, weused
the data on interest payments and net income in 1983 from partnerships in
a subset of the real estate industryincluding "operators and lessors of
buildings" and "lessors, other than buildings." For estates and trusts, we
used information from the Statistics of income data for 1982 on thefraction of
estate and trust income coming from interest income.Finally, for Schedule
F income, we used information from the 1980 Statistics of incomefor sole
proprietorships in farming.
Calculation of Labor Income.The text uses labor income as a classifier for
presenting the distributional impact of taxation and as the taxbase for
policy simulation. Our procedure for calculating labor income with thedata
base available to us is described below.
We defined labor income to equal the sum of wages and salaries,
unemployment compensation, and pension income (since this is a fringe
benefit omitted from the wage and salary figures) minus employee busi-
ness expenses. The principal conceptualproblem arises in the case of
self-employed individuals, where the reported income from self-employ-
ment includes a return to both labor and capital. Incomefrom self-
employment could be reported on Schedules C, E, or F. In these cases, we
calculated the income from self-employment as it would be under a cash-
flow tax. In particular, we estimated the amount of new investmentthat
year and allowed this amount as an expense,but disallowed depreciation
and net interest deductions.
This approach provides a tax base that does not distort new investment
decisions. However, it provides only a rough measure of labor income. To
measure labor income directly, we wouldlike to subtract an estimate of
capital income from total income. If the complicated tax treatment of a
particular type of capital in 1983 can be summarized by an equivalent tax on
economic income at some rateT,then (by construction) the gross income
earned by that capital would equal [rI(1 - i-) + 61K, where 6 is the economic
depreciation rate, r is the real opportunity cost of funds, and K is the realDo We Collect any Revenue from Taxing Capital Income?123
capital stock.36 In contrast, if the real capital stock is growing atsome
constant rate g, then new investment expenditures would equal (g + )K.
Our approach therefore provides a good approximation of labor incometo
the degree that gr/(1 - ',-). Given the widely varying approaches used in
estimating the real opportunity cost of funds, and the widely varying
estimates of the effective tax rate on capital, it is difficult to judge the quality
of this approximation.37
The only data in the tax file helpful for estimating cash flow isnet income
from each of these schedules. We proceeded by estimating fromaggregate
data the ratio of the cash flow to the net income for each type of business;
we then multiplied each net income figure in the tax files by the appropri-
ate aggregate ratio. In measuring cash flow, we started with net income,
then eliminated interest, depletion, and depreciation deductions, and
replaced them with a deduction for the estimated value ofnew invest-
ments.
The key problem is estimating new investment expenditures. The best
procedure we came up with was to assume that the ratio for corporations
of new investment expenditures to depreciation deductions would have
the same value for noncorporate firms. The general strategywas to
estimate investment expenditures for each group of noncorporate firms by
the depreciation deductions taken by this group of firms multiplied by the
ratio in the previous sentence. In fact, we constructed two ratios:one for
corporations as a whole, and one for corporations in the real estate
industry. We used the second ratio to estimate the investment expendi-
tures for noncorporate real estate firms and for partnerships with losses,
since most of these losses arose from firms in the real estate industry. The
first ratio was used in all other cases.
This procedure should slightly overestimate investment expendituresto
the degree that noncorporate firms expense investment expendituresmore
frequently under section 176, or overestimate their depreciation deduc-
tions, as suggested by the figure for misreporting appearing in Table 8.10
in the July 1987 Survey of current business. When we usedour procedure to
forecast total new noncorporate investment from the net income figures
reported in the tax returns, our estimate was about 20 percent larger than
the investment figure reported by NIPA for noncorporate and farm capital
expenditures. Therefore, our procedure should slightly overestimate the
See, for example, Auerbach (1983) for a use of this approach in defining the effective income
tax rate.
A clear difference arises in the case of land, since there is no new investment in land, but
investments in land earn a return.124Gordon & Slemrod
revenue loss from shifting to taxing cash flow under the personal income
tax.
In defining labor income for partnerships, we then constructed ratios of
cash flow to net income from the aggregate data, doing this separately for
partnerships with profits or losses, and we multiplied the net income
figures reported in the individual tax returns by the appropriate ratio to
estimate the labor income from these partnerships. One problem encoun-
tered was that the 1983 statistics of income for partnerships reported depreci-
ation deductions only for all partnerships, for all real estate partnerships,
and for all farm partnerships without differentiating between partnerships
with profits or losses. We therefore used balance sheet data from 1982 for
firms with profits and losses,38 along with this information on total
depreciation deductions, to estimate the depreciation deductions sepa-
rately for firms with profits and losses.39
For rental income from Schedule E, we used the same procedure
described earlier to calculate the ratio of new investment expenditures
minus depreciation and depletion deductions to net income, but we
restricted the procedure to data on real estate partnerships. For Subchapter
S corporations, the equivalent procedure was used based on the data
reported in the 1983 statistics of income for corporations. For Schedule C, we
used the ratios of new investment expenditures minus depreciation to net
income found for partnerships. Finally, for farms we used the ratios of new
investment expenditures minus depreciation to net income found for farm
partnerships.
These estimates of labor and capital income for 1983 may not be
representative of their normal values, given the severe recession that was
occurring in 1983. Under our procedure for dividing observed net income
between labor and capital components, any drop in new investment in
capital or in inventories in 1983 relative to their normal values will result in
an unusually low estimate of capital income, whereas any drop insales
revenue relative to other expenses will result in an unusually low estimate
of labor income. It is difficult to judge whether our procedure provides a
Balance sheet data were not available for 1983.
In particular, for partnerships in farming and real estate, we assumed that the depreciation
deductions in 1983 for firms with profits versus losses would be proportional to the book
capital stocks in 1982 for firms with profits versus losses. For partnerships as a whole, we
formed an initial forecast for the depreciation deductions for firms with profits versus losses,
then divided the observed total depreciation deduction in 1983 in proportion to these two
estimates. For firms with losses, our initial forecast equaled the product of the book capital
stock in 1982 for these firms and the ratio of depredation deductions to book value for real
estate firms in 1982. (The real estate industry generated a large fraction of total partnership
losses.) For firms with profits, our initial estimate equaled the remaining depreciation
deductions taken by all firms in 1982.Do We Collect any Revenue from Taxing Capital Income?125
misleading estimate of the normal percentage breakdown between labor
and capital income.
Calculation of the Cash Flow from Corporations.Under the version of a
cash-flow tax we consider, real assets are taxed based on their cash flow,
but cash flow from financial assets is made tax exempt. In calculating the
resulting cash-flow tax base for corporations, we proceededas follows.
To begin with, we eliminated net interest payments, and net capital
gains, from net taxable income. Here, capital gains are measured by capital
gains taxable at ordinary rates plus 28/46 percent of capital gains taxableat
the alternative rate of 28 percent.4° In addition, we eliminated net dividend
income from taxable income, where net dividend income is definedto
equal domestic dividends minus the dividends received deduction minus
the public utility dividend paid deduction.' We also eliminated depletion
allowances from taxable income, since they are not justified byany cash
flow.
Next, we replaced depreciation and amortization deductions bya deduc-
tion for investment expenditures. Note, however, that, undera cash-flow
tax, when used capital is sold from one firm to another, the purchasing firm
would deduct the purchase cost of the acquired capital, but the selling firm
would be taxed on the entire proceeds from the sale of the capital. As long
as both firms faced the same tax rate, the net tax effects would exactly
offset. Therefore the cash-flow tax base can be measured either by deduct-
ing expenditures on new capital and exempting all capital gainsor by
deducting all investment expenditures but adding the entire proceeds from
the sale of used assets into the tax base. We adopted the first approach.
Our measure of new investment expenditures was based on the figure
for nonfarm nonfinancial corporate capital expenditures in 1983 reported in
the July 1987 Survey of current business. However, we eliminated the
inventory investment component of this figure, since we deal with inven-
tories separately. In addition, our industry definition included farms but
not Subchapter S corporations, so we estimated new investment withinour
industry definition by multiplying the reported figure by the ratio of
depreciation deductions taken within our set of industries to depreciation
deductions reported in nonfarm nonfinancial industries. Finally, the set of
capital investments included in the published figure differs slightly from
40 Capital gains from the sale of financial assets but not real assets would be eliminatedunder
our definition of the tax base. However, as we describe later, since we measure investment
expenditures by expenditures only on new investment, we need to eliminate capital gains from
the sale of real assets from the tax base as well.
41 Under a cash-flow tax, either this income is tax exempt or it is taxable but the firmpaying
the dividend gets to deduct this payment; we adopted the first approach.126Gordon & Slemrod
TABLE Al
Changes in Corporate Taxable Income in 1983 under aCash-Flow Tax
(billions of 1983 dollars)
the set that is depreciated on the tax forms. For example,investments in
foreign branches are depreciated but are omitted from theNIPA figure,
whereas various mining expenditures are not depreciatedbut do appear in
the NIPA figure. To make this correction, wemultiplied the published
figure by the ratio of corporate depreciation deductions onthe tax forms to
the NIPA figure for depreciation, before adjustment, asreported in Table
8.10 in the July 1987 Survey of current business. This yielded anestimate of
new investment of $259.0,compared with the published figure of $274.9.
Our final step in developing a measure of cash flowdealt with the
treatment of inventories. Under a cash-flow tax,expenditures on invento-
ries would be deductible, but under the existing tax somevaluation of
withdrawals from inventory is deductible. These two differ on average
because withdrawals from inventory are priced usingolder prices, and
because of any growth in the size of inventories, due topurchases
exceeding withdrawals. The difference between expenditures oninvento-
ries and accounting withdrawals in a year equals thechange in the
inventory balance sheet during that year. Wetherefore allowed the
difference between the balance sheet inventory in 1983and 1982 as a
further deduction.
The resulting changes in taxable income are listed inTable Al. We
estimate that net taxable income under acash-flow tax would be $41.3
billion dollars higher than net taxable income underthe 1983 law. In
addition, under a cash-flow tax the investment taxcredit would be
eliminated. Investment tax credits taken in 1983 minus the taxescollected
+ Net interest payments 96.6
+ Depletion allowances 7.4
+ Depreciation deductions 218.0
+ Amortization 3.4
- New investment expenditures 259.0
- Net dividend income 7.7
- Net capital gains 17.3
- Inventory expend. - deduct. 14.6
= Net change in taxable income 26.8
+ Investment tax credit (ITC) 15.2
- Tax on recapture of ITC 1.1
= Net ITC payments 14.1Do We Collect any Revenue from Taxing Capital Income?127
from the recapture of previous tax credit payments equaled $14.1 bfflion
dollars.42
Calculation of Implicit Ownership of Nontaxable Interest-Bearing Assets.
In the text, we found that the net interest payments of the government and
of individuals and corporations as reported in their tax returns totaled
$104.8 billion. Since foreigners paid on net $5.9 bfflion in interest to U.S.
residents, U.S. residents must have received in total $110.7 in interest
income in one of a variety of forms that do not directly show up as taxable
income of individuals or corporations. When analyzing the distributional
effects of the two tax changes, taking into account the effects of the
resulting drop in the market interest rate, we therefore face the problem of
calculating the incidence among lifferent types of individuals of the drop in
this nontaxable interest income.
To do this, we first estimate the interest receipts of corporate pensions by
extrapolating from 1980 to 1983 the information about the bond holdings of
pensions reported in Kotlikoff-Smith (1983), and applying the market
interest rate for Aaa bonds in 1983. We forecast that these pension plans
received $45.0 billion in interest income in 1983. Of that total, we assume
that three-quarters of the income accrues to defined benefit plans and
one-quarter to defined contribution plans. (According to Kotlikoff-Smith,
participants in defined benefit plans outnumber participants in defined
contribution plans by 3 to 1.) For defined benefit plans, we assume that the
benefits are indeed defined by the plan, so any change in the earnings
received by these plans accrues to corporate shareholders. This change is
assigned to individuals in proportion to their dividend receipts and
changes their taxable income in the same way as described whenwe
allocated changes in corporate tax payments. The change in interest
receipts of defined contribution plans is assumed to be borne by individuals
in proportion to their wage and salary income, but does not affect their
taxable income.
State and local governments owned $271.8 billion of taxable debtsecu-
rities in 1983. By assigning market interest rates separately to their holdings
of time deposits, government bonds, and mortgages, we estimate their
interest income to be $30.0 bfflion. We assume that a decline in the interest
income of state and local governments wifi be reflected in increased tax
levies on individuals Thus, we increased the state and local tax payments
of itemizers proportionately, assuming that the fraction of the tax increase
To the degree that firms are unusually constrained by low profits in 1983 from receiving a
credit on all qualified investments, this figure wifi be too lowmore unused credits available
from 1983 investments will be carried backward or forward and eventually received than have
been carried forward into 1983 from past years.128Gordon & Sleinrod
borne by itemizers equals the ratio of the AGI of itemizers to aggregate
Ad, which in our sample is 60 percent. The pretax income of nonitemizers
is assumed to change in proportion to their federal taxliability, the
proportion being chosen to total in aggregate 40 percent of the change in
state and local interest income.
The remaining $35.7 billion of net interest income represents a variety of
situations, including underreported receipts, receipts of nonfilers, divi-
dends of interest-receiving mutual funds, receipts of nonprofit organiza-
tions, and receipts through IRA and Keogh plans. Rather than attempt a
detailed assignment of the effects of interest rate changes in each situation,
we assumed that the change in interest receiptsearned through these
sources is borne in proportion to individuals' ScheduleB interest receipts
and wifi not be part of taxable income.
Transition Tax Losses under a Cash-Flow Tax versus Long-Run Revenue
Gains.We assume that upon enactment of a cash-flow tax, businesses
would be allowed to continue to depredate and amortize existing capital.
We therefore attempt to calculate the present value of the tax loss due to
these deductions. In addition, we need to calculate the tax loss from the
write-off of existing stocks of inventories.
First consider depreciation deductions. Corporate depredation deduc-
tions on existing capital in 1982 were $194.7 billion. We assume for
simplicity that nominal investment has been growing smoothly at rate g, a
constant percent s of new investment is in structures, the tax depreciation
rate on equipment can be approximated by exponential depreciationof 40
percent per year, and tax depreciation of structures can be approximatedby
exponential depredation at 10 percent per year.43 If new investment in 1982
is I, then depreciation deductions that year should satisfy
00 (00
0.1 5(g+O.l)tdt + 0.4 I(1 - s)Ie dt = -194.7.
Jo Jo
Given estimates of the various parameters, we then solved this equation for
I. We set g equal to the nominal growth rate in investment expenditures
between 1962 and 1982, which equaled 0.102, and we set s equal to the
average fraction of new investment that went into structuresduring the
previous 10 years, which came out to 0.361; together these parameters
imply an estimate of I of $283.0 billion, which is quite close to the value of
4 This assumes that the actual law can be well approximated by double declining balance
depredation with lifetimes of five years for equipment and twenty years for structures.
Allowed depredation rates were somewhat slower, but there was a compensating switch to
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$259.0 observed in the data. The discounted present value of future
depreciation deductions equals44
0.11e_(iT e°°55J(±O.l)! dtIdT
Jo [ Jo ]
+ 0.41e O.4)r[e_021(1s)Ie_+O4)tdtldr,
Jo I Jo
where i is the nominal discount rate. We set this rate equal to 0.088, using
a before-tax nominal longer-term interest rate in 1983 of 0.11 and a tax rate
of 0.2. Given this rate, the present value of future depreciation deductions
equals $497.6 bfflion.
In 1982, partnerships and Subchapter S corporations together took
depreciation deductions of $38.9 billion, whereas in 1980 proprietorships
took $25.8 billion in depreciation. Ignoring changes between 1980 and 1982,
we found that total noncorporate depreciation deductions in 1982 were
$64.7 billion. Using the same procedure, we forecast that the present value
of depreciation deductions on the existing noncorporate capital would be
$165.4 bfflion.
In 1982, corporations claimed $3.3 bfflion in amortization deductions. If
these intangible assets are all depreciated using a straight-line formulaover
five years, and investment in these assets was equal in the previous five
years, then the present value of future amortization deductions on existing
intangible capital would be(0.8 - 0.2t)3.3/(1 + i)t.If i = 0.88, this
expression equals $6.1 billion. Amortization by noncorporate firmswas
trivial, so we ignore it.
The stock of corporate inventories at the end of 1982 was $538.1 billion.
After a shift to a cash-flow tax, we assume that corporations wifi be allowed
to gradually write off existing inventories at the same time that they are
deducting all new purchases of inventories. In particular, we assume that
20 percent of the remaining stock of inventories will be deducted eachyear,
implying that the present value of inventory deductions from existing
stocks wifi be 0.2 J538.1e_(2dt. Given i = 0.088, this comes out to
$373.7 billion. Similarly, partnerships had an inventory stock of $100.7
billion in 1982. Using the same procedure, we find that the present value of
their inventory deductions would be $69.9 billion.
The depreciation taken in 1982 equals approximately the integrated amount during the time
interval - .5 to .5. In calculating later depreciation, we therefore start at time .5, so aged the
capital stock half a year using the terms e°5 and e130Gordon & Slemrod
Therefore, the transitory tax losses from depreciation, amortization, and
inventory deductions would equal 0.318(497.6 + 6.1 + 373.7) +m(165.4 +
69.9), where m equals the average marginal tax rate faced by noncorporate
firms. Estimating m to be 0.219, we obtain a one-time revenue lossof $329.8
billion.
In contrast, ignoring these transitory losses, we forecast that the revenue
gain from this tax change would be $17.4 billion in 1983, and infuture years
would be larger in nominal terms due to real growth in the economy as well
as due to inflation. The discounted presentvalue of these revenue gains
would therefore be f 17.4e e)t dt, wherer is the inflation rate and 0
is the growth rate of the economy. In 1983, the inflation rate was0.038
while the average growth rate in real GNP from 1963 to 1983 was 0.028.
Together, these figures imply that the present value of revenue gains
equals $790.9 billion, which substantially exceeds the one-time revenue loss
in the transition to a cash-flow tax.
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